

2. 10:30 p.m. -- Mr. Bush and Secretary Acheson arrived at the Department. Mr. Bush informed Secretary Acheson by telephone, and suggested Security Council action.

3. 11:20 p.m. -- Secretary Acheson telephoned the President in Independence. The possibility of Security Council action was discussed.

4. 11:30 p.m. -- Mr. Hickerson telephoned Secretary General Lile to inform him that a request for an emergency meeting of the Security Council was being considered.

5. 12 midnight - 2 a.m. -- Drafting of a) notification to UN and request for immediate meeting of the Security Council; b) resolution to be introduced in the Security Council; c) statement to be made by Mr. Gross in the Security Council.

(Miss Bacon of FE and Mr. Wainhouse of WEP)

6. 1 a.m. -- A circular telegram to missions in critical areas requested "utmost vigilance and report any positive or negative evidence however fragmentary" in view of the possibility that Korea might be the first of a series of Soviet moves. (TAB 2)

7. 2 a.m. -- The Secretary gave final approval to the Security Council action; texts of the request for an immediate meeting of the Council and of the draft resolution to be introduced were telephoned to USUN.

RE: only if there is record of how decision to take UN action was made.

RE: action of this is a record of this Council's action.

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RE: any documentation on this decision?

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY DATE 5/12/61

REASON FOR XDS/EXT. DATE

TE AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE ☐

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PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

5. 2 a.m. -- The Department informed the Embassy in Seoul that Security Council action was being planned and requested continuing fullest reports. (Tel 613) ----- (TAB 3)

9. 2 a.m. -- A circular telegram to missions in Security Council member states requested the respective Governments be urged to instruct their Security Council representatives immediately. ----- (TAB 4)

10. 2:05 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio (Tel 929) urged the Department to support a request directed by NEAG to CINCPAC for immediate shipment to Pusan of ten days' supply of ammunition;

Korean stocks would be exhausted within ten days; the Republic's forces would fight bravely if supplied. ----- (TAB 5)

11. 2:30 a.m. -- Mr. Hickerson telephoned with Secretary General Lie and Ambassador Gross concerning the Security Council action.

Handwritten: TLE: Memo of conversation

12. 2:54 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio (Tel 928) reported an interview with President Rhee in which the latter requested arms and ammunition be sent. "He hoped that the US would take action to 'maintain the present situation in Formosa,' because he would 'like to see the Chinese Communists kept occupied for a while.'" ----- (TAB 6)

13. 3:00 a.m. -- Ambassador Gross transmitted to Mr. Lie by telephone the official request for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. (For text see Annex A: Security Council Official Records, No. 15, 25 June 1950, p. 1, fn. 1.)

14. 4:00 a.m. -- Mr. Enak spoke by telephone with Mr. Allison and Mr. Sabald in Tokyo. His attempt to obtain fuller military information and to learn whether there had been a North Korean declaration of war (if so, the position in the Security Council would be clearer) was unsuccessful.

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15. 5:44 a.m. -- Ambassadoruccio (Tel 931) transmitted a translation of an official announcement broadcast by the Pyongyang radio that forces of the South Korean puppet regime invaded North Korea, and threatening "decisive countermeasures." (TAB 7)

16. 6:46 a.m. -- Ambassadoruccio (Tel 935) reported increasing activity of unopposed North Korean planes; he expressed hope that some speedy action could be taken to give the Republic assistance in the air, for which above all they would look to the US, as this might be the decisive factor in the future course of hostilities. (TAB 8)

17. 7:58 a.m. -- Ambassadoruccio (Tel 938) reported that Chairman Liu of UNIOK had informed the Embassy the Commission was reporting to the Secretary General and asking him to "consider possibility" of bringing the matter before the Security Council. If the situation "deteriorates tomorrow" they would definitely request such action; meantime they are to broadcast a cease-fire appeal. (TAB 9)

18. 8:44 a.m. -- In a Department of the Army telecon between General Collins and staff (Mr. Bond present for State) and Tokyo G-2, Tokyo reported its estimate that the North Korean assault was an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea* although no declaration of war could be confirmed as yet, that KMAC requests for an emergency supply of ammunition were being met, and that the safety and/or evacuation of US nationals was being studied. (TAB 10)

Of. General MacArthur's personal views (Annex D)

19. 9:59 a.m. -- Moscow Embassy (Barbour) telegraphed (No. 1726) its view that attack on Korea was a clear-cut Soviet challenge which the US should answer "firmly and swiftly", including military help and vigorous action in the Security Council; it considered the Soviet calculation was that the

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US would allow "neutralization" and consequent victory for North Koreans; reaffirmed April 24 estimate of Soviet intentions that they were not prepared to risk possibility of a full scale war with the West. (Ambassador Kirk concurred in these views on his return to Moscow -- Tel 1736, June 26.) ----- (TAB 11)

20. 10:35 a.m. -- Mr. Dulles and Mr. Allison in a telegram from Tokyo (Tel 619) stated their belief that if the South Koreans could repulse the attack, "US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves". They suggested Security Council action was possible under Article 106. ----- (TAB 12)

21. 11:30 a.m. -- State-Army conference. For State, Messrs. Webb, Bask, Merchant, Jessup, Perkins, Hickerson, Matthews, Achilles, Yost, Barnes, Davies and Miss Fendick; for Army, Secretary Pace, Asst. Secretary Bandtsen and military officers. Available military information was reviewed.

RE: Review of meeting?

22. 11:32 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio (Tel. 941) reported that in view of reported massing of North Korean tanks 17 miles north of Seoul he has reluctantly decided to evacuate dependent women and children the next morning through the port of Incheon. -- (TAB 13)

23. 12:15 p.m. -- Secretary Acheson entered the State-Army conference and General Collins joined it at 12:30. The circle of conferees was reduced. Possible courses of US military action were discussed.

RE: Review of meeting?

24. 12:26 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio (Tel. 940) reported President Rhee's decision to move his Government to Taejon. He had failed to convince the President that the defenses of Seoul should be adequate, and had informed him that the Embassy would remain in Seoul. ----- (TAB 14)

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25. [2-3 p.m.] -- In a series of conversations with members of UN delegations and of the Secretariat Mr. Moyes pressed the point of view adopted in the American resolution; some members were reluctant to concede that evidence for a clear case of aggression by North Korea was yet at hand. (TAB 15)

26. 2:45 p.m. -- The Secretary telephoned the President and suggested that he return to Washington. This action was the result of the State-Army conferences of the preceding hours.

27. 3-6 p.m. -- The Security Council convened, heard the statement by Ambassador Green, and adopted with slight amendments the American resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces. (See Annex A).

28. 4 p.m. -- The Department instructed Embassy Moscow (Tel 538) to bring the North Korean attack directly to the attention of the Soviet Government, and to state: "In view universally known fact of USSR controlling influence over North Korean regime US Government asks assurance USSR disavows responsibility... and that it will use its influence with North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately." (TAB 16)

RE: Who took part in the decision? Any record of conferences on it?

29. 5:05 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported (Tel 945) that he had evacuated more than 700 dependents and women employees from Seoul to Ascom and was negotiating with ships at Inchon for their removal to Japan. (TAB 17)

30. 6 p.m. -- The Department informed Ambassador Muccio (Tel. 612) that decisions were expected within a matter of hours as to whether CINCPAC would receive authority to furnish ammunition without regard to existing programs and to act "directly to influence situation based on safety US citizens". In the meantime it was essential for the Korean forces to pull themselves together, and military advisers were asked to remain actively associated with the Korean army as long as possible. (TAB 18)

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31. 7:45 p.m. -- Blair House meeting with the President.
Present for the Department were the Secretary, Mr. Webb, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Jessup. Defense was represented by Secretary Johnson, the three service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs. Secretary Acheson presented a series of recommendations at the outset of the meeting, (pp. 1-2 of the memorandum) after which the President asked for a statement of views by the others present. At the conclusion of the meeting the President ordered: 1) General MacArthur was to send the suggested supplies to the Koreans; 2) General MacArthur was to send a survey group to Korea; 3) The indicated elements of the fleet were to be sent to Japan; 4) The Air Force should prepare plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East; 5) Careful calculation should be made of the next probable place in which Soviet action might take place. (A memorandum by General MacArthur dated June 14, stating the military considerations which in his view made it essential to deny Formosa to the Chinese Communists, was read before the meeting proper began.) ----- (TAB 19)

32. 8:05 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported (Tel 946) that the forces of the Republic seem to have stabilized the situation and that there was some evidence that North Korean armor and artillery were withdrawing. ----- (TAB 20)

RE: Did Secretary have a paper of recommendations to him? If so is there a record on its presentation?

Annexed Documents and Background Information

A - Security Council Official Records, No. 15, 25 June 1950.

B - OIR Intelligence Estimate No. 7 - Korea (Preliminary Version)
June 25, 1950.

C - Special Guidance on Korea, No. 1, June 25, 1950, 11:40 p.m.,
issued to INP and IBD.

D - Statement of Mr. John Allison on Events in Tokyo following
Communist Attack on the Republic of Korea, June 25-27, 1950.

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Summary of Actions and Decisions - June 26, 1950

(All entries are in Washington time; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 1:00 a.m. -- The Department instructed Ambassador Muccio to follow as bold a course as he deemed reasonable on phasing further evacuation, in view of tonside decisions about to be implemented which would profit from any time gained. (Tel 620) --- (TAB 1)

2. 5:26 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio replied to the Department's 620 that he did not plan further evacuation unless the situation worsened. (Tel 954) --- (TAB 2)

3. 5:49 a.m. -- Request received from Ambassador Muccio that air cover be maintained until evacuation of dependent women and children was concluded. (Tel 955) --- (TAB 3)

4. 6:02 a.m. -- Appeals of the Korean National Assembly to the President and Congress of the United States and the UN General Assembly for support and effective and timely aid were received from Embassy Seoul. (Tel 951) --- (TAB 4)

5. 6:14 a.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported a Norwegian ship had evacuated 682 dependents from Korea; about 300 potential dependent evacuees, including non-Americans, remained at Pusan or were enroute there. (Tel 953) --- (TAB 5)

6. 8:09 a.m. -- Embassy Moscow questioned the tactical desirability of a direct approach to the Soviet Government in accordance with the Department's telegram 538 (June 25, Entry 28). Embassy suggested confining the representation to the routine procedure of notifying the Soviet Government of the action taken in the UN and to urging Soviet cooperation in seeking a solution of the question. This would permit a Soviet withdrawal when the risks became clear. (Tel 1734) --- (TAB 6)